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Death By A Thousand Cuts: 
The Rule Against Perpetuities 
Angelo M. Vallario· 
I. Introduction 
Much too familiar to us all is Professor John Chipman Gray's theorem on the 
Rule Against Perpetuities (the Rule) that no interest is good unless it vests or fails 
within a life in being plus 21 years. I However, a recent trend has begun among juris-
dictions to statutorily abolish the Rule for contingent interests in trusts with private 
beneficiaries. Currently, seven jurisdictions: Maryland,2 llIinois,l Alaska. 4 Delaware,' 
South Dakota,6 Wisconsin7 and Idahos have abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
The abolishment of the Rule Against Perpetuities encourages settlors to create contin-
gent interests in trusts that will last forever. These trusts are sometimes referred to as 
"dynasty" trusts.9 
The legislation provides wealthy settIors with transfer tax advantages and allows 
jurisdictions to remain competitive in the trust capital business. lo The abolishment 
legislation at first glance appears advantageous because it has transfer tax advantages 
for wealthy settIors, yet the ability of settIors to exercise dead hand control could have 
devastating affects on trust beneficiaries and the community at large. Dead hand con-
trol interferes with the marketability of trust assets and perpetuates the concentration of 
wealth. I I 
This article suggests the policy and social justifications against dead hand control 
far outweigh transfer tax advantages provided to wealthy settIors and the potential 
revenue expected to be generated by the abolishment legislation. The abolishment 
legislation may be readily adopted by other jurisdictions in light of the legislatures' 
failure to recognize the consequences of unlimited dead hand control. 
This article recognizes that the Rule is complicated,I2 and Rule violations pres-
• A.."'1gela M. Vallario is a Visiting Assistant PrOfessor at Howard University School of Law; 
B.S. University of Florida; J.D., University of Baltimore; LL.M. (Taxation) Georgetown University Law 
Center. 
I. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AOAINST PERPETUI11ES 191 (4th ed. 1942). 
2. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1I-I02(e) (Supp. 1998). 
3. 765 ILL COMPo STAT. 305/2-6 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998). 
4. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050(a)(3) (Michie 1998). 
5. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503(a) (Supp. 1998). 
6. S.D. CODIAED LAWS § 43-5-8 (Michie 1997). 
7. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998). 
8. IDAHO CODE § 55·111 (1994). 
9. This article will focus on the irrevocable dynasty trusts designed to benefit multiple benefi-
ciaries for numerous generations. It is created to last forever and avoids the rule against perpetuities. 
10. The Delaware preamble states that Delaware's abolishment legislation was enacted to "[k]eep 
Delaware competitive in the trust capita!." Jesse Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts: Sheltering Descendants 
From Transfer Taxes, 23 EST. PLAN. 417, 422 (1996) [hereinafter Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts]. 
11. See infra Part V.C.I-2. 
12. See infra note 13; however, some scholars note that there are other areas within American 
law far more complex than the Rule. Raymond C. O'Brien, Analytical Principle: A Guide for Lapse, 
Survivorship, Death Without Issue and the Rule, \0 GBO. MASON L. REv. 383 (1988). 
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ent harsh consequences for practitioners and their clients. In fact, violations of the 
Rule, due to its complexity, have been held as an attorney error, not subject to a mal-
practice claim. '3 The complexities of the Rule and the harsh consequences for the 
violations thereof, initiated and resulted in the variations of reform. 
American reform doctrines, such as the "wait and see", Uniform Statutory Rule 
Against Perpetuities (US RAP) and cy pres have altered the strict requirements of the 
Rule. The reform doctrines make determinations as to the vesting of contingent inter-
ests based on actual events ("wait and see"),14 extend the vesting period to ninety 
years (USRAP)'S or permit equitable reformation to fix Rule violations (cy pres).16 A 
vast majority of the jurisdictions have adopted one form or another of the reform doc-
trines. 17 Even so, the common law Rule remains in twenty-one jurisdictions. IS 
A brief discussion of the origin of the Rule, basic elements and the modern 
reform, are useful for a fuller understanding of this article's critique of the abolishment 
legislation. After the brief discussion of the Rule and reform, this article categorizes 
the abolishmept legislation as the 1998 abolishment legislation;'9 the additional-incen-
tive jurisdictions2o and the forerunners of abolishment.21 After categorizing the abol-
ishment legislation, this article compares the arguments against the abolishment leg-
islation to its advantages. Furthermore, this article emphasizes that the abolishment 
legislation has ignored dead hand control in favor of providing wealthy ~ttlors with an 
estate planning tool to minimize federal transfer taxes. In conclusion, this article sug-
gests that in light of the consequences of dead hand control the abolishment legislation 
should be stopped. Failure to stop the trend among jurisdictions could result in the 
Federal government curtailing dead hand control. 
II. Background 
The Rule attempts to limit dead hand control by prohibiting the remote vesting 
of contingent interests.22 Whether or not an interest violates the Rule depends on 
whether or not vesting of a future interest occurs within the Rule's period.23 The ef-
fect of the Rule is that to the extent that the vesting occurs beyond the Rule's period 
13. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d. 583, 364 P.2d 685, (1961). In that case a beneficiary brought a 
malpractice action against an attorney who drafted a residual testamentary trust which violated the 
Rule. The Supreme Coun of California noted that an attorney who renders legal services agrees to use 
such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill. Due to the complexities of the Rule, 
an attorney of ordinary skill could have misapplied the rule and therefore is not liable for malpractice. 
14. See infra Pan IV.A. 
15. See infra Pan IV.B. 
16. See infra Pan IV.C. 
17. Eight jurisdictions have adopted wait and see; twenty-four jurisdictions have adopted USRAP; 
seven jurisdictions have adopted cy pres. 
18. Jurisdictions adhering to common law Rule include: Alabama, Arkansas, the District of C0-
lumbia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming. 
Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts, supra note 10, at 419. Most of these jurisdictions have also adopted one 
of the reform doctrines to alleviate the strict requirements of the Rule. Jd. 
19. The 1998 abolishment legislation includes Maryland and Illinois. See infra Pan V.B.1. 
20. Additional incentives such as asset protections and no requirement of fiduciary income tax 
returns are offered in Alaska, Delaware and South Dakota. See infra Pan V.B.2. 
21. The forerunners at enacting the abolishment legislation include Wisconsin and Idaho. See infra 
Pan V.B.3. 
22. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 291 (4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter 
DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY). 
23. The Rule's period is the measuring life plus 21 years. See infra Pan III. 
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the interest is void.24 
The Rule had its origins in the seventeenth century and was the result of a com-
promise between wealthy landowners who desired to keep land within the family and 
royal judges who tried to resist such efforts.2S The wealthy landowner, in an attempt 
to accomplish this objective, used many forms of land settlement involving future 
interests to control his property after his death.26 Such "dead hand" control effectively 
restricted the alienability of land and consequently the sociological and economic im-
pact was significant. 27 
The Duke of Norfolk's CaselS was the first successful move by the royal judges 
to limit the dead hand control.29 In the Duke of Norfolk's Case the courts permitted 
the settlor to control the disposition of property for a person's lifetime (the measuring 
life),JO provided the life existed at the time the interest was created.31 This was 
viewed by courts to be a reasonable limitation on the settlor's control on property. The 
settlor was permitted to exercise his judgment and control as to any then-living benefi-
ciaries and their abilities to handle the rights and responsibilities of property owner-
ship.32 Eventually the reasonable period of dead hand control was extended to account 
for the unborn infantlbeneficiary.33 Courts subsequently permitted the settlor to restrict 
the alienability of land and exercise dead hand control and hinder marketability for a 
time period as long as that of the measuring life plus twenty-one years.34 
Although the Rule was set out in the Duke of Norfolk's Case, Professor Gray 
was the first person to articulate the Rule with its widespread notoriety "no interest is 
good unless it must vest, if at all, not later then twenty-one years after some life in 
being at the creation of the interest.,,3s 
In summary, the Rule was the result of a compromise between the interests of 
wealthy landowners and judges trying to prevent the dead from controlling the fu-
24. THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE To EsTATES IN LAND AND FuTuRE IN-
TERESTS 179 (2d ed. 1984). 
25. DUKEMINlER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 291. 
26. BERGIN, supra note 24, at 179. 
27. [d. 
28. 3 Ch. Cas. I, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1681). 
29. The facts of this famous case, known for implementing the Rule arose when the wealth of 
the Earl of Arundel was at risk of passing his estate to his eldest insane son. By law, the eldest son 
was entitled to his father's wealth. Earl did not want his property to go to his insane son; instead he 
wanted to control the property from his grave. Earl of Arundel enlisted the help of his lawyer to a 
create trust to protect his family from his eldest son's actions. The Court acknowledged that Earl of 
Arundel's concern was legitimate, and developed a reasonable period during which Earl's judgment 
could prevail. According to the court, the father could realistically recognize the capabilities of living 
members of his family, and so, with respect to them, the father's informed judgment solemnly in-
scribed in an instrument was given effect The Earl was permitted to control only so long as his judg-
ment was informed with an understanding of the capabilities and needs of persons alive when the 
judgment was made. 
30. See infra Part III. 
31. DUKEMINlER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 291. 
32. [d. 
33. After almost 150 years of applying the Rule, the courts fixed the period during which the set-
tlor could exercise dead hand control to the measuring life plus 21 years to account for a contingent 
interest vesting in favor of a minor. Cadell v. Palmer, I CI. & F. 372 (1833). 
34. DUKEMINlER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 299. 
35. See GRAY, supra note I; see also BERGIN, supra note 24, at 178; DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, 
supra note 22, at 291. 
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ture.36 The compromise is that property may be tied up in contingent interests for 
lives in being plus twenty-one years, but no longer.37 In effect, a landowner could 
"provide for all of those in his family whom he could have personally known and the 
first generation thereafter attaining majority."38 
Ill. Basic Elements of the Rule 
The Rule voids a contingent interesfl' that may not necessarily vest or fail with-
in a measuring life40 plus twenty-one years (common law Rule period).41 The com-
mon law Rule permits a trust to endure for selected lives in being at the creation of the 
trust42 plus twenty-one years.43 For example, a testator at death,44 may transfer 
property into a trust for the benefit of his children for life and then to his grandchil-
dren who reach age twenty-one.4S The trust will last for the lives of his children plus 
twenty-one years. If the child was ten at the trust's creation46 and he or she lives to 
seventy, the trust can endure for eighty-one years (sixty years for the life in being plus 
an additional twenty-one years). This article will only address the contingent remain-
der47 in a dynasty trust. 48 The Rule does not require that the trust terminate within 
the Rule period, but does require that the contingent interests vest or fail within that 
period. The abolishment legislation permits the trust to last forever and does not re-
quire the contingent interest to vest or fail to vest. 49 
In analyzing an interest under the Rule, one must trrst determine whether the 
interest is subject to the Rule's application.~ To determine if an interest violates the 
36. See supra notes 28-29. 
37. The wealthy decedent can control disposition of property for the lifetime of the person whose 
propensities he or she may know or fear and for 21 years thereafter. It denies the wealthy decedent 
the right to control disposition of property beyond 21 years after the death of the persons alive at cre-
ation. 
38. 6 AM. L. OF PRoP. § 24.16 (1952). 
39. Contingent interests include contingent remainders and executory interests. Vested interests are 
exempt. The possibility of reverter and right of entry are not included. See O'Brien, supra note 12 
This article only addresses the contingent remainders in a dynasty trust. 
40. See infra Part III. 
41. John K. Phoebus, The Rule Against Perpetuities-The Implication of a Reasonable Time for the 
Performance of a Contingency to the Vesting of Future Interests in Commercial Transac-
tions-Maryland's Hybrid Approach to the Rule Against Perpetuities in Commercial Contexts, 101 
DICK. L. REv. 619, 621 (1997). 
42. See infra Part II. 
43. GRAY, supra note I. 
44. The creation of the interests is at the death of the Testator. 
45. The interest left to the grandchildren is a contingent remainder to which the Rule applies. The 
interest is subject to a condition precedent that must occur prior to taking. The condition precedent is 
the grandchild reaching age 21. Thus the Rule applies to this interest. 
46. Because the transfer is by will, the creation is at the testator's death. 
47. A contingent remainder is subject to a condition precedent or owned by unascertained persons. 
BERGIN, supra note 24, at 73. Executory interests are also governed by the Rule but not addressed in 
this article. See supra note 39. 
48. A dynasty trust sometimes referred to as the perpetual or generation-skipping transfer trust is 
generally a future interest trust intended to benefit multiple beneficiaries in multiple generations and 
continue forever. Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts, supra note 10. 
49. For the above example, the abolishment legislation would permit the settlor to transfer prop-
erty into a trust for the lives of his children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and future generations. 
All interests could be conditioned on survivorship. There would be no requirement that a measuring 
life or measuring lives be in existence at the creation· of the interests. 
50. Contingent remainders are always subject to the Rule. DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, 
at 266. 
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Rule, an interest is judged prospectively from the time of the interest's creation, with-
out regard to events that occur after the interest's creation. According to W. Barton 
Leach, a scholar, critic and whose writings'l initiated much of the American reform 
of the Rule: 
[A] future interest is invalid unless it is absolutely certain that it must vest within 
the period of perpetuities. Probability of vesting, however great, is not sufficient. 
Moreover, the certainty of vesting must have existed at the time when the instru-
ment took effect. . . . It is immaterial that the contingencies actually do occur 
within the permissible period or actually have occurred when the validity of the 
instrument is fIrst litigated. 52 
In order to determine if the interest will vest within the Rule period, a measuring 
life must be identified.'3 One specific person, alive at the time of the creation of the 
interest, need not be singled out and identified as the measuring life, provided the 
interest vests within the life of one person, among a definable group of persons, plus 
21 years.'4 
If the will or trust is drafted with a contingent interest which violates the Rule, 
the interest may not be void if the will or trust was drafted in a jurisdiction that recog-
nizes one of the various reform doctrines" or included a savings clause.~ 
IV. Modem Reforms to the Rule 
Since the Cadell v. Palmer7 case in 1833, the common law Rule has undergone 
tremendous reform in England'S as well as in America.'9 Reform was brought about 
largely as a result of the absurd consequences of strict compliance with the Rule.60 In . 
America, there have been many efforts and many doctrines adopted to reduce the 
effects of the Rule and to remedy the violations thereof. Some of these reform doc-
trines include the "wait and see" doctrine, the Uniforms Statutory Rule Against Perpe-
tuities (US RAP) and cy pres.61 
51. See infra note 71. 
52. w. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. REV. 638 (1938) [hereinafter Leach, 
Nutshell]. 
53. A contingent interest must vest within the life of, or at the death of the person, or within 21 
years after the death of the person. That person is the measuring life. A measuring life can be a pre-
ceding life tenant, the taker or takers of the contingent interest, anyone who can affect the identity of 
the takers, and anyone who can affect a condition precedent. DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, supra note 22. 
54. BERGIN, supra note 24, at 181; see also Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321 (1908); Dickson v. 
Renfro, 569 S.W.2d 66 (Ark. 1978); Wing v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 241 S.E.2d 397 (N.C. 
1978). 
55. See infra Part IV. 
56. A savings clause is a trust or will provision that provides for the termination or distribution 
in the event of a Rule violation. See Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts, supra note 10, at 3-4. 
57. Cadell, I Cl. & F. 372. 
58. The Perpetuities & Accumulations Act, 1964, ch. 55. For a more detailed discussion of the 
reform doctrines adopted in England, see W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Reform by Legislation: Eng-
land, 70 MARV. L. REV. 1411 (1957) [hereinafter Leach, Perpetuities Reform]; Robert J. Lynn, Perpe-
tuities Reform: An Analysis of Developments in England and the United States, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 
508 (1965). 
59. See infra Part IV.A-C. 
60. See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1124 
(1960) [hereinafter Leach, Hail Pennsylvania]. See infra note 66. 
61. For a brief description of the reform doctrines, see infra Part IV.A-C. 
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Professor Leach, a leading authority in the field and instrumental in the legisla-
tive reform doctrines, once referred to the Rule as a "technically-ridden nightmare".62 
The Rule's application and harsh consequences63 led many scholars and lawyers to 
call for reform doctrines.64 The reform doctrines have alleviated the strict require-
ments of the historical Rule.65 Modem efforts to reform the Rule were widely accept-
ed and welcomed in an effort to reduce the absurd consequences66 of the Rule.67 
A. "Wait and See" 
Jurisdictions that have not eliminated the effect of the Rule have either enacted 
legislation68 or by judiclal decision69 adopted the "wait and see" doctrine, which 
takes a bite out of the Rule.70 Professor Leach's position which brought about the 
"wait and see" reform doctrine is based on the premise that the vesting of contingent 
htterests should reflect actual events as opposed to mere possibilities.71 Under this 
doctrine interests are judged, based on actual events as opposed to prospectively exam-
ining the interest.72 Jurisdictions that follow this approach73 will not void an interest 
for violating the Rule unless an actual event or the actual nonoccurrence of an event 
prevents an interest from vesting or failing within the Rule's period. 
In 1947, Pennsylvania became the first jurisdiction to adopt the broad "wait and 
see" doctrine now adopted in eight stateS.74 One jurisdiction7s has adopted a more 
limited form of the "wait and see" approach. That jurisdiction waits only until the 
expiration of the life estates possessed by individuals who were lives in being at the 
62. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Legislation Massachusetts Style, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1349 (1954) 
[hereinafter Leach, Massachusetts Style]. 
63. See Dickerson v. Union, 595 S.W.2d 677 (Ark. 1980). This case is know as the "unborn wid-
ow case". In Dickerson, the Testatrix created a trust to continue "until the death of both sons and one 
son, Martin's widow and until the youngest of either son has reached the age of twenty-five years." 
The court held the trust violated the rule since the son's "widow" might not be born at the Testatrix's 
death. 
64. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rules' Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. 
L. REV. 721,739-41 (1952) [hereinafter Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective]. 
65. The reform relief is primarily from not mandating that the interest be judged prospectively 
based on a mere possibility that the interest could fail. 
66. See lee v. Audley 29 End. Rep 1186 (1787). In lee, a contingent interest violated the Rule 
because of the absurd possibility that a 70-year old woman might bear children. This case gained wide 
notoriety as the fertile 'octogenarian situation, that a person is always presumed to be able to have 
children regardless of age or physical condition. DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 311. 
67. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY. 
68. See infra note 74. 
69. New Hampshire adopted wait and see by judicial decision. Merchants National Bank v. Curtis, 
97 A.2d 207 (N.H. 1953). 
70. DUKEMINJER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 312. 
71. Leach, Nutshell, supra note 52; Leach, Hail Pennsylvania, supra note 60; Leach, Massachu-
setts Style, supra note 62; Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective, supra note 64; W. Barton Leach, The 
Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 HARv. L. REv. 1329 (1938); W. Barton Leach, 
Powers of Sale in Trustees and The Rule Against Perpetuities, 47 HARv. L. REV. 948 (1934). 
72. Phoebus, supra note 41. 
73. Infra notes 74-75. 
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4-5 (1950). The other seven states are: Iowa, Kentucky, Ohio, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.68 (West 1992); Ky. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Michie 1972 & Supp. 1996); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2131.08c (West 
1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-38 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 27, § 501 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 
55-13.3 (Michie 1995); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 11.98.130, 11.98.900 (1998). 
75. Maine is the only jurisdiction using this approach. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 33, § 101 (West 
1998). Prior to the abolishment legislation Maryland also was a limited wait and see jurisdiction. 
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time the interest was created to determine if the contingent interest will vest or fail 
within twenty-one years of that time.76 
B. Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities 
In addition to the above-mentioned variations of the "wait and see" doctrine, a 
majority of the jurisdictions have adopted the USRAP.77 USRAP validates interests 
that comply with the common law Rule. In the event that the interest does not comply 
with the common law Rule all interests will be valid if they actually vest within a 90-
year "wait and see" period. If the interests do not actually vest within 90 years, a court 
will reform the trust to comply with the settlor's intent.7s 
Therefore, the common law justification of permitting settlors to control only 
property during the lives of persons who they know and whose ability they can judge 
plus 21 years thereafter was virtually eliminated by jurisdictions adopting the 
USRAP.79 USRAP allows the drafter to specify which period (common law Rule peri-
od or 90-year "wait and see" period) governs trust termination. The settlor can not 
select the longer Rule period based on actual events.so 
C. Cy Pres 
Reform is also permitted under the cy pres doctrine.s, The cy pres doctrine al-
76. Id. 
77. Currently 24 jurisdictions have adopted USRAP including: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colora-
do. Connecticut. Florida. Georgia. Hawaii. Indiana, Kansas. Massachusetts. Michigan. Minnesota. Mon-
tana. Nebraska. Nevada. New Jersey. New Mexico. North Carolina. North Dakota. Oregon. South Car0-
lina. Tennessee and West Virginia. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.27.050-34.27.090 (Michie 1998) ; ARIz. 
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2901-14-2906 (West Supp. 1997); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21200-21231 (West 
Supp. 1994); COLO REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-11-1101 to 15-\1-\107 (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 45a-490 to 45a-496 (West 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 689.225 (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 44-6-200 to 44-6-206 (1998); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 525-1 to 525-6 (Michie 1993); IND. 
CODE ANN. §§ 32-1-4.5-1 to 32-1-4.5-6 (Michie 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-3401 to 59-3408 
(1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A § I-II (West 199\); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 554.71-
554.78 (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50IA.01-50IA.07 (West 1990); MONT. CoDE ANN. 
§§ 72-2-1001 to 72-2-1007 (1997); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 76-2001 to 76-2008 (Michie 1995); NEV. 
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.103-111.1039 (Michie 1998); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2F-I-46:2F-8 (West 
Supp. 1997) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-2-901 to 45-2-906 (Michie 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-15 
to 41-22 (1998); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-02-27.1 to 47-02-27.5 (1997); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 105.950-
105.975 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-10 to 27-6-80 (Law Co-op. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 
66-1-201 to 66-1-208 (1999); W. VA. CODE §§ 36-IA-1 to 361A-8 (1997). 
78. Perpetuities Table of Jurisdictions. Uniform Law Annotated. Master Edition 8B U.L.A. 41 
(Supp. 1996). 
79. USRAP abandons the idea of the Rule period being tied to a measuring life in existence at 
the time of the creation. Derming the Rule period in this way was based on the policy that it was 
reasonable to allow donors to control property during the lives of persons they could have known and 
whose abilities they could judge. DUKEMINIER. PROPERTY. supra note 22. at 314. However. some 
scholars believe that the 9O-year wait and see period is justified because it was less confusing than 
identifying a measuring life. See Mary L. Fellows. Testing Perpetuity Reform: A Study of Perpetuity 
Cases 1984-89, 25 REAL PROP PROB. & TR. J. 597 (1991). The adoption of the USRAP reform by 
jurisdictions has abandoned the initial basis of the Rule period being tied to a measuring life plus 21 
years. The policy arguments against USRAP reform is beyond the scope of this article. 
80. However. a special power of appointment can be given to a donee to subsequently change the 
perpetuity period. 
8!. Idaho. Iowa, Kentucky. Missouri. Ohio. Rhode Island Vermont have adopted a Cy pres statute. 
See IDAHO CODE § 55-III (1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.68 (West 1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
381.216 (Michie 1972 & Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.555 (West 1986); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2131.08 (Anderson 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-1 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 2328 
(1998); BERGIN. supra note 24. at 178-80; Phoebus. supra note 41. 
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lows courts to reform interests so that they will not violate the Rule.82 A broad ver-
sion of this doctrine pennits equitable reformation to modify any transaction that 
would violate the RUle.83 A more limited version of cy pres applies only to invalid 
age contingencies, allowing courts to reduce the age contingency to 21 years, thus sav-
ing the interests.84 
The existence of the reform doctrines minimizes the harsh results of violations of 
the Rule. The common law Rule reform was intended to "disturb the common law rule 
as little as possible.,,8s Despite the overwhelming existence-of reform, jurisdictions are 
abolishing the Rule to minimize transfer taxes for wealth settlors and generate income 
for the banking industry. 
v. Abolishment of the Rule 
A. Overview of Abolishment Legislation 
Most recently, legislators have been taking an aggressive stand towards abolish-
ing the Rule for interests in trusts with private beneficiaries (hereinafter abolishment 
legislation). The abolishment legislation permits a settlor to create a dynasty trust. 86 
The legislation has been enacted to provide a wealthy settlor with another vehicle by 
which he or she can minimize transfer taxes and to provide the state with a "carrot" to 
attract trust business to its state and allow the banking industry to profit.87 A settlor is 
free to create an inter vivos trust in any jurisdiction that he or she chooses.88 There-
fore, the abolishment legislation creates an incentive for a non-resident settlor to create 
an inter vivos trust in a jurisdiction that has enacted said legislation. Creating an inter 
vivos trust in an abolishment legislation jurisdiction will allow trust assets to be admin-
istered in that jurisdiction and trust companies will generate income therefrom. Further-
more, the legislation may generate additional revenue by way of income tax.59 
There are three categories of abolishment legislation. The 1998-abolishment 
legislation, which includes Maryland90 and Illinois.91 These jurisdictions have similar 
requirements and became effective in 1998. The additional-incentive jurisdictions are 
82. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33. § 101 (West 1998). 
83. California adopted full-scale cy pres in 1963. CAL CIv. CODE § 715.5 (West Supp. 1964). 
84. [d. 
85. Commissioner report on subsection 9(b) reprinted in 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 6104 
(1998); Phoebus, supra note 41. But see supra note 79. 
86. See supra note 48 for definition of dynasty trust. 
87. See fiscal analysis of Maryland Bill which states "due to the rule against perpetuities, all 
trusts in Maryland generally must terminate between 80 to 110 years after creation. Several others 
states have modified the rule against perpetuities in order to permit the creation of the perpetual dy-
nasty trust. Therefore, a Maryland resident can currently create a perpetual dynasty trust, but only if 
the trust is located in a state that modified the rule against perpetuities in this regard (i.e., if the trust 
is administered by a banking institution located in one of those states). As a result of the [abolishment 
legislation] bill, Maryland banks could administer perpetual dynasty trusts." H.B. 495 (Md. 1998). 
88. Trust law is a creature of state law. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co. 24 A.2d 
309, 313 (Del. 1942). The jurisdiction of domicile controls testamentary trusts whereas a settlor may 
forum shop for a desirable jurisdiction for his or her inter vivos trust. 
89. Maryland's fiscal analysis indicates that state income tax revenues could increase to the extent 
that Maryland banks receive additional income in the form of trust administration fees. See Md. H. 
Res. 495; see infra Part V.B.2. 
90. Testamentary or inter vivos trusts created on or after October I, 1998 are governed by the 
Maryland abolishment legislation. See supra note 2. 
91. Testamentary or inter vivos trusts created on or after January I, 1998 are governed by the Il-
linois abolishment legislation. See supra note 3. 
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Alaska. 92 Delaware,93 and South Dakota.94 These jurisdictions do not impose an in-
come tax on the income generated by the fiduciary of the dynasty trust and protect 
trust assets from the settlor's creditors. The third category groups the forerunners of 
the abolishment legislation, Wisconsin~ and ldaho.96 The forerunner jurisdictions 
pre-dated the other abolishment legislation by more than a. decade and were enacted 
for different reasons. The following discussion does not discuss the individual legisla-
tion, but discusses the legislation as categorized. 
B. The Abolishment Legislation 
1. The 1998-abolishment legislation 
Maryland97 and IIIinois98 were the most recent jurisdictions to enact abolish-
ment legislation. These jurisdictions allow estate planners to draft trust documents with 
contingent interests that avoid the Rule.99 The 1998-abolishment legislation requires 
that the trust document express the settlor's intent to avoid the Ruleloo and the trustee 
is given the power to "sell, lease or mortgage property for any period beyond the peri-
od of the rule against perpetuities".lol 
The 1998-abolishment legislation was enacted to encourage and/or keep trust 
business within the state's boundaries and appears to be a direct response to other 
legislation previously enacted.102 Maryland and Illinois wanted to discourage its resi-
dents from taking trust business to neighboring jurisdictionslo3 where dynasty trusts 
were permitted. 104 The advantages gained from allowing a settlor to create a dynasty 
trust are that wealthy settlors can minimize transfer taxes!05 trustees will generate 
92 ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050(a)(3) (Michie 1998). 
93. DEL. CoDE ANN. til 25, § 503(a) (Supp. 1998). 
94. S.D. CODIRED LAWS § 51A-6A (Michie 1997). 
95. WISC. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998). 
96. IDAHO CODE § 55-III (1994). 
97. See supra note 2 for trusts executed or amended on or after October I, 1998. 
98. See supra note 3. Effective August 17, 1997 for trusts created on or after January I, 1998. 
99. The Rule is avoided by expressing an intent to avoid the Rule and including amongst the 
trust terms the trustee's ability to buy and sell trust assets. 
100. Under Maryland law, the governing instrument must state that the Rule Against Perpetuities 
does not apply to the trusl MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 11-102(e) (Supp. 1998). The I11inois 
statute uses the term "qualified perpetual trust" which requires specific trust terms to dictate that the 
rule against perpetuities does not apply. 765 ILL. COMPo STAT. § 305/3(a-5)(i) (West 1993 & Supp. 
1998). 
101. Id. § 11-102(e); 765 IIL. COMPo STAT. § 305/3(a-5)(i)-(ii). 
102. Five jurisdictions had enacted the abolishment legislation at the time the 1998-abolishment leg-
islation was being considered. Those jurisdictions include Illinois, Alaska, Delaware, South Dakota, 
Wisconsin and Idaho. Furthermore, Maryland's fiscal analysis states that a Maryland resident could cre-
ate a dynasty trust in other jurisdictions. See Md. H. Res. 495. 
103. Delaware and Wisconsin had previously enacted abolishment legislation at the time the Mary-
land and Illinois enacted the 1998-abolishment legislation. It is obvious that the 1998-abolishment legis-
lation was enacted due to the potential threat of loosing trust business to these neighboring states. 
104. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503 (Supp. 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West 1997 & 
Supp. 1998). 
lOS. Wealthy settlors minimize transfer taxes by placing assets in trust and providing the further 
generations of beneficiaries with only a life estate which is not subject to an additional transfer tax at 
the beneficiaries' subsequent death. I.R.C. § 2036 (1998). However, to the extent the trust assets are 
available for a generation more than one generation removed from the settlor (skip generations) the 
transfer in tnist may be subject to a generation skipping transfer tax. See infra Part V.C.3. 
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additional revenue, and additional income tax will be generated for the state.106 Law-
makers justified the legislation, without any reference to or limitation on dead hand 
control. The 1998-abolishment legislation implied that the generation-skipping transfer 
tax imposes sufficient controls on the wealthy dead hand. 107 
It is not surprising that the bankers' association heavily supported the abolish-
ment legislation. lOS The 1998-abolishment legislation virtually had no opposition. IOIJ 
There was no support for retaining the Rule and its reform doctrines for contingent 
interests in trusts with private beneficiaries. Consequently, dead hand control returns 
for such interests. Thus, the Rule, which originated as a reasonable limitation on dead 
hand control, no longer reflects this historical compromise. IIO It is apparent that 
wealth has prevailed. The wealthy settlor who desires to exercise dead hand control 
may do so by testamentary or inter vivos trust. II I 
In sum, the 1998-abolishment legislation has identical requirements: (1) that the 
settlor's intent to avoid the Rule be clear from the trust terms and (2) that the trustee 
have the ability to sell trust assets. 112 The drafter can create dynasty trusts, allowing 
the trusts to remain in existence forever, thus dead hand control returns. The legislation 
was motivated by jurisdictions competing for trust business. Additionally, wealthy 
settlors minimize transfer taxes,1I3 and additional income is generated,1I4 as a result 
of settlors creating trusts in these jurisdictions and corporate trustees, liS primarily the 
trust banking companies,1I6 earning additional trust commissions and paying addi-
tional income taxes. 
106. See supra note 89. 
107. Maryland's fiscal analysis further demonstrated a wealthy settlor's ability to minimize estate 
taxes by noting that the dynasty trust would be especially suited for transfers within the settlor's one-
million dollar generation skipping transfer tax exemption. The analysis stated that transfers within the 
settlor's one-million dollar exemption received favorable transfer tax advantages, implying that settlors 
would not likely make transfers in excess of the generation-skipping transfer tax exemption, thus the 
one-million dollar exemption was a sufficient limitation on dead hand control. See Md. H. Res. 495; 
see infra Part V;C.3. 
108. In Maryland the Maryland Bankers' Association testified on behalf of the legislation and was 
listed as the Information Source. See Md. H. Res. 495. 
109. No one-from the academic community was contacted regarding the Maryland 1998-abolishment 
legislation. There was no testimony in favor of retaining the Rule and its current refonn, which then 
permitted property to be held in trust for 80 to 110 years after its creation. See supra note 87. 
110. See supra Part II. 
III. If the individual is domiciled in an abolishment legislation jurisdiction using a testamentary or 
inter vivos trust or if the settlor is not domiciled in an abolishment legislation jurisdiction by forum 
shopping and creating an inter vivos trust 
112. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § ll-102(e) (Supp. 1998); 765 ILL. COMPo STAT. § 305/3(a-
5)(i)-(ii) (West 1993 & Supp. 1998). 
113. See infra Part V.D.1. 
114. The 1998-abolishment legislation is expected to result in "a minimal increase in general funds 
revenue" as a result of the increased corporate income tax generated by trust companies from the 
additional trustee commissions earned from administering the dynasty trusts. See Md. H. Res. 495. 
115. A settlor may select a corporate or individual trustee. A corporate trustee is the better candi-
date for the position because of the continuity in management that can be provided. A dynasty trust 
will last several generations and an entity is the only trustee, which endure forever like the perpetual 
trust 
116. With the creation of a perpetual trust designed to last forever, it is likely that corporate trust-
ees will be selected. The indefinite duration of corporate trustees encourages its selection over an indi-
vidual trustee with successor trustees named. The problem with naming individual trustees and succes-
sor trustees is that the settlor can not name unborn individuals. 
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2. Additional incentives are available in Alaska, Delaware and South Dakota 
Like the 1998-abolishment legislation, the abolishment legislation in these addi-
tional-incentive jurisdictions permits dead hand control. These states do not impose a 
fiduciary income tax on the trust income I 17 and/or offer the settlor asset 
protection. liB Asset protection allows trust assets to be insulated from the settlor's 
creditors and unforeseen circumstances of future generations. 
a. Alaska 
In 1997 Alaska amended its statute ll9 to validate an interest in a trust if all or 
part of the income or principal of the trust may be distributed under the discretion of 
the trustee to a life in being at the creation of the interest. 120 If the named trustee is 
given the power to make discretionary distributions of principal or income to a benefi-
ciary living at the creation, the property interest created in the trust will be valid even 
if that interest remains contingent for generations. 
Unique to the Alaska abolishment legislation is the requirement that a discretion-
ary trust be established in which the trustee has the ability to distribute to a life in 
being at the trust's creation. 12I There is no other requirement imposed on the settlor. 
The trustee is not required to exercise said discretion favorably to beneficiaries. Absent 
abuse of discretion, the trustee can not be forced to exercise discretion in favor of 
distributing to a life in being.122 
b. Delaware 
In 1995 Delaware amended its statute to include personal property.123 In Dela-
ware, wealthy landowners were always at liberty to exercise dead hand control. Dela-
ware amended its abolishment legislation for personal property held in a trust as to 
documents created on or after July 7, 1995}24 It was clear that Delaware amended its 
abolishment legislation, in an effort to keep its trust business competitive. 125 
The 1995 amendment to include personal property along with land was brought 
about at a time in which the traditional notion of land equaling wealth was not neces-
sarily the case. 126 After the drastic decline in the real estate market across the nation 
117. In South Dakota there is no state income tax. S.D. CODIFlED LAWS § 43-5-8 (Michie 1997). 
This is advantageous for the non-resident settlor or non-resident beneficiary if income tax can be 
avoided in his domicliary state. See Pierce H. McDowell, The Dynasty Trust: Protective Armor for 
Generations to Come: Special Use Trusts, 132 TR. & EsT. 47-54 (1993). Delaware for example, does 
not have a state fiduciary or capital gains tax on trust accumulations for non-resident beneficiaries. 
118. AlASKA STAT. §§ 13.12.205(2)(A), 13.36.035(a),(c), 13.36.045(a)(2), 13.36.310, 13.36.390, 
34.27.050(a)(3), 34.40.010 (Michie 1998) (amending the Alaskan trust law to protect settlor's assets 
from creditors. See also Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New 
Millenniwn, or, We Don't Have to Think of England Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REV. 543, 578 n.60 (1998). 
119. Alaska previously recognized USRAP reform. 
120. AlASKA STAT. § 34.27.050(a)(3) (Michie 1998). 
121. [d. 
122. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959). 
123. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 25, § 503(a) (Supp. 1998). 
124. [d. 
125. [d.; Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts, supra note 10, at 422-23. 
126. Wealth today has changed from real property to personal property that is readily liquid such 
as stocks, bonds, mutual funds and interest-bearing bank accounts. See O'Brien, supra note 12, at 383 
n.2. 
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suffered in the early 1990's, Delaware was quick to act in amending its legislation to 
provide the once wealthy landowner with the ability to exercise dead hand control over 
personal property.127 The Delaware abolishment legislation was direct in addressing 
its reason for abolishing the Rule for personal property. The amendment to the Dela-
ware Code states the abolishment legislation was enacted to "[k]eep Delaware competi-
tive in the fonnations of trust capital."I28 The purpose of the abolishment legislation 
amendment was expressly to attract trust business to its state. 
Delaware's abolishment legislation amendment was clearly made from an eco-
nomic perspective. The return to dead hand control did not disturb the legislators of 
Delaware as is obvious from its decision to never adopt the Rule for real property. 
Delaware was quick to amend its legislation to provide for the change in investments 
brought about after the decline in the real estate market. 
In addition to the dynasty trust, Delaware offers its citizens and non-residents 
added features not shared with all abolishment legislation jurisdictions. Delaware has 
no state fiduciary income tax filing requirement and asset protection. l29 In addition to 
dead hand control, income tax savings feature and asset protections are added incen-
tives to creating a Delaware dynasty trust. 
c. South Dakota 
South Dakota is an added-incentive jurisdiction and offers the features previously 
mentioned for Alaska and Delaware. However, South Dakota was more than a decade 
ahead of the other additional-incentive jurisdictions. As early as 1983,130 the purpose 
of South Dakota legislation was to attract trust business to the state. 131 Furthennore, 
the South Dakota statute pennits the fonnation of a private trust company in its ju-
risdiction. 132 There is a $200,000 capital requirement and a $5,000 application fee, in 
order to sign on board. 133 
3. The forerunners of abolishment legislation were Wisconsin and Idaho 
a. Wisconsin 
In 1976, Wisconsin enacted abolishment legislation. l34 Wisconsin enacted a 
statute that put it quite clearly. "[Tlhe common law rule against perpetuities is not in 
force in this state."m The Wisconsin statute provides that "[t]here is no suspension 
of the power of alienation by a trust or by equitable interests under a trust if the trust-
ee has power to sell, either expressed or implied, or if there is an unlimited power to 
127. In 1995, land had not been appreciating like it once was and even depreciating in some cas-
es, the stock market was healthy, interest rates were declining and investments in personal property for 
investors were more attractive than the traditional land investment 
128. Tit. 25, § 503(a); Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts, supra note 10, at 422-23. 
129. Tit. 25, § 503(a); John E. Sullivan, Gutting Rule Against Self-Settled Trusts: How The New 
Delaware Trust Law Computes With Offshore Trusts, 23 DEL. 1. CORP. L. 423 (1998). Asset protection 
insulates the trust assets from the settlor's creditors. 
130. S.D. CODIAED LAWS § 51A-6A (Michie 1998). 
131. S.D. CODIAED LAWS § 43-5-8 (Michie 1997). 
132. S.D. CODIAED LAWS § 51A-6A (Michie 1998). 
133. [d. §§ 5IA-6A-19, 5IA-6A-6; Thomas H. Foye, Using South Dakota Law for Perpetual 
Trusts, PROB. & PRoP. (1998). 
134. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.16(5) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998). 
135. [d. 
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tenninate in one or more persons in being."I36 
The Wisconsin statute does impose statutory requirements that the trustee have 
the power to sell or an unlimited power to tenninate in order for the trust instrument to 
avoid the harsh consequences of the Rule. 
b. Idaho 
The abolishment legislation started in Idaho, a state primarily of land wealth, in 
response to a 1949 case from the Idaho Supreme Court, which abolished the Rule.137 
Idaho adopted what is intended to be a complete system governing alienation of real 
propertyl38 and the common law rule against perpetuities was not in force in that ju-
risdiction:39 Idaho has no suspension rule for personal property:40 Idaho's abolish-
ment legislation states that there shall be no rule against perpetuities applicable to real 
or personal property. Idaho did not limit its abolition legislation to real property but in-
stead enacted broad legislation, which included both real and personal property. Addi-
tionally, the Idaho statute, similar to several of the subsequently enacted abolishment 
statutes, required that the trustee have discretion or the power to sell the trust property 
to avoid any suspension problems.141 
The Idaho abolishment legislation, like many of the jurisdictions that eventually 
followed, failed to statutorily provide the beneficiaries with a means by which prema-
ture trust termination could be handled. 142 Furthermore, pennitting the dead hand to 
control property in the future based on facts unknown to the settlor at the time of 
creation of the trust could have devastating effects for the beneficiaries and his or her 
heirs. Idaho's reasoning behind taking the initial step towards abolishment legislation 
was not to attract trust business to the state of Idaho in 1949 and thereafter. Instead the 
legislative intent was to deal with the overriding concerns that legislators had in pre-
serving the settlor's intent. 143 At that time, the policy concerns favoring the reflection 
of the settlor's intent outweighed the policy justifications behind the common law 
Rule. 144 
136. Id. § 700.16(3). 
137. Locklear v. Tucker, 203 P.2d 380 (Idaho .1949). 
138. IDAHO CODE § 55-III (1994). 
139. Locklear. 203 P.2d at 380. 
140. IDAHO CODE § 55-III (1994). 
141. Id. 
142. For example, suppose the settlor, a fannland owner in Idaho, transfers fannland into a trust in 
which the trustee was given the ability to sell assets. There was no mandatory requirement imposed on 
the trustee with respect to the distribution of income or principal. At the creation, it was the settlor's 
intent to keep the fannland within the family forever. At some future time, well after the settlor's 
death, the expenses of administering the trust far exceeded the income. Small tracts of the property 
will be sold at discounted values to pay trust expenses. The trustee has no power to terminate. There-
fore small tracts of the fann will be sold off indefmitely until all trust assets are gone. Furthermore, 
trust beneficiaries do not have liquidity to purchase the tracts because the dead as opposed to the 
living is controlling wealth and deceased settlors did not adequately provide for unforeseen circum-
stances. The problems that arise with permitting this dead hand control is that even though the trustee 
has the power to sell, he may not exercise his or her discretion to do so. Small tracts of fannland 
could eventually be disposed of in a fashion that clearly was not in the best interest of the beneficia-
ries. 
143. Various aspects of trust law, such as the enforcement of a spendthrift trust that thrives on 
giving great weight to honoring the settlor's intent. Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 
(1882). 
144. Id. 
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C. The Argument Against Abolishment Legislation 
Although a persuasive argument could be made for the abolishment legisla-
tion,l45 the abolishment legislation ignores the policy argument that property rights 
belong to the living not the dead. The abolishment legislation allows wealthy settlors 
to create a dynasty trust and control property for many generations after their death. 
The Rule's compromise was inspired to prevent inalienability of property and dead 
hand control. l46 The trustee's ability to sell trust assets resolves the concern of in-
alienability.'47 However, dead hand control is a valid concern and should not be over-
looked. 
Dead hand control caused by the abolishment: (1) hinders the marketability of 
property;l48 (2) perpetuates the concentration of wealth;149 (3) is discouraged only 
by the generation-skipping transfer tax;ISO and (4) fails to provide the beneficiaries 
with a means for terminating the dynasty trust based on unforeseen circumstances. 151 
Problems such as trust assets being unavailable for social needs, debtor-creditor issues, 
beneficiary resentment, and uninformed forum shopping are also consequences of the 
settlor exercising unrestricted dead hand control. 
1. Marketability 
Excessive restraints on property ownership destroy the property's marketabili-
ty.'S2 Dead hand control frustrates the ability of current equitable owners and pro-
spective purchasers to engage in a transaction that could make them both better off. 
Dynasty trusts may result in inefficient use of resources because of unforeseen con-
tingencies that disadvantage the beneficiaries and community as a whole. ls3 Further-
more, when property is held in a dynasty trust, the persons in possession of the proper-
ty lose the ability to make decisions based on individual preferences regarding property 
ownership. 154 
On its face, the abolishment legislation appears to alleviate the lack of market-
ability caused by dead hand control by requiring that the trustee have the ability to sell 
trust assets or have the discretion to terminate.'ss However, the ability to sell trust 
145. Dukeminier, supra note 10. According to Dukeminier, in his article addressed to estate plan-
ners, the Rule is no longer essential to fulfil the functions of ensuring that property is freely alienable 
and curtailing dead hand control. Dukeminier further states the usefulness or lack thereof, of the Rule 
when compared to the complexities and uncertainties and time invested in learning and remembering 
the Rule and or reform doctrines pemaps makes the abolishment legislation makes a sensible solution. 
146. See supra Part II-III. 
147. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050(a)(3) (Michie 1998); IDAHO CODE § 55-III (1994); 765 IlL. 
COMPo STAT. 305/2-6 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1I-102(e) 
(Supp. 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998). 
148. See infra Part V.C.1. 
149. See infra Part V.C.2. 
150. See infra Part V.C.3. 
151. See infra Part V.C.4. 
152. DUKEMINlER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 283. 
153. See, McDowell, supra note 117, at 47 (mentioning editors now requiring sale of Boston Globe 
was prompted by expiration of family trusts). 
154. It is also expected that the dynasty trust will be funded with "keep sake" assets like farmland 
or ranch interests in a closely held business. Beneficiaries' preferences to retain these assets may be 
outweighed by trustees making decisions solely from an economic perspective. See SC 28 ALI-ABA 
379 H(I)(b)(d). 
155. The 1998-abolishment legislation requires that the settlor's intent be expressed and that the 
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assets or the discretion to tenninate does not mandate the trustee do so, even if the 
failure to do so is not beneficial for the trust beneficiaries. Dynasty trusts will likely 
provide the trustee with broad discretion to accommodate various changes in the tax 
laws. This discretion permits the trustee to make decisions based on changed or un-
foreseen circumstances not present or known to the settlor at the creation of the 
truSt. IS6 The broad discretion is like a double-edged sword, in that the trustee has the 
ability to liquidate trust assets or terminate the trust, but no guarantee that the trustee 
will exercise said discretion. Providing the trustee with broad discretion, absent an 
abuse of discretion,ls7 beneficiaries will be unable to force the trustee to sell or retain 
trust assets even if it is in everyone's best interest. 
The abolishment legislation favors wealthy settlors' intent to exercise unlimited 
dead hand control. As a result, assets are tied up in trust arrangements potentially 
forever and the marketability of the trust assets is hindered which damages not only 
the beneficiaries but also the community at large. Additionally ,the abolishment 
legislation's mandatory requirement that the trustee have the ability to sell assets does 
nothing to guarantee marketability. Dynasty trusts will be drafted with broad discre-
tionary powers, to account for changed or unforeseen changes in the law, and such 
discretion will protect the trustee from being liable for his action regarding the sale or 
onsale of trust assests. Despite the fact that the abolishment legislation attempts to 
alleviate the marketability concerns of dead hand control, the abolishment legislation 
provides no grounds for enforcement by trust beneficiaries. 
Wealthy members of one generation control disposition. Even if the trustee has 
the ability to sell assets, proceeds remain controlled by the trust provisions forever. 
The wealthy members of one generation should not be permitted to ignore preferences 
of future generations regarding the use and disposition of property. 
2. Perpetuates the concentration of wealth 
Additionally, the abolishment legislation perpetuates the concentration of 
wealth.ls8 Abolishment legislation protects the rich from liquidating their property 
holdings and distributing cash through spending. ls9 If rich beneficiaries cannot make 
trustee have the ability to sell trust assets. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-102(e) (Supp. 
1998); 765 ILL. COMPo STAT. 305/3(a-5)(i)-(ii) (West 1993 & Supp. 1998). In Alaska the only require-
ment is that a discretionary trust be established giving the trustee the ability to tenninate in favor of a 
measuring life. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050(a)(3) (Michie 1998). Delaware imposes no required trust 
provision and abolishes the Rule for personality in response to the change in the definition of wealth. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503(a) (Supp. 1998). South Dakota and Wisconsin provide the settlor with 
the option of giving the trustee the ability to sell or discretion to tenninate. S.D. CODIFlED LAws 
§ 43-5-8 (Michie 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998). Idaho, like the 1998 
abolishment legislation, requires that the trustee have the ability to sell trust assets. IDAHO CODE § 55-
III (1994). 
156. Furthennore because of the nature of the trust, over time the individual trustee, either acting 
on behalf of a corporate trustee or in his or her individual capacity, is likely to change and be far re-
moved from knowing who the settlor was and what the settlor would have wanted. In light of this 
anticipated distance between the trustee and settlor, the trustee should be expected to make discretion-
ary decisions from an economic perspective without taking into consideration the settlor's subjective 
intent. 
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959). An example of abuse of discretion includes 
the trustee refusing to tenninate to preserve his, her or its trust commission. 
158. Phoebus, supra note 41. 
159. See G. Graham Waite, Let's Abolish The Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL EST. L.I. 93 
(1993), in which a survey of 48 attorneys reflected that a person should be allowed to make money 
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decisions to sell the property then the beneficiaries cannot liquidate their interest and 
spread wealth around by consuming. The perpetuation of the power and control held 
by the settlor keeps wealth from being acquired and/or distributed to others. 
For example, Bill Gates could create a dynasty trust and concentrate his wealth 
of $97,541,600,000 (hereinafter the Gates' wealth).'60 If the Gates' wealth is retained 
in a dynasty trust, assets reinvested at an annual 8% rate of return and not spread 
around by beneficiary consumption, after 100 years his accumulation would mount to 
$214,568,232,600. 161 This represents the potential impact that one wealthy individual 
could have by perpetuating his wealth. The additional accumulation and concentration 
of wealth by others promotes the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer. Fur-
thermore, the concentration of wealth may make it impossible for those born outside 
the umbrella of inherited wealth to break into that chain of wealth. 162 
The concentration of wealth is not healthy for Americans and could lead to un-
equal treatment based on wealth. 163 It is essential to a healthy economic society that 
the wealth accumulation of one generation be placed back into society by the next 
generation in the way of spending as opposed to continued wealth accumulation. 164 
The abolishment legislation provides an attractive avenue for wealthy individuals to 
continue accumulation of wealth without the needed spending. The continued accumu-
lation of wealth discourages socialism between the wealthy and others which could 
ultimately lead to Americans being further separated, further discrimination based on 
wealth and other sociological and economic consequences. 
3. The generation-skipping transfer tax imposes a nominal limitation on dead 
hand control 
If dead hand control is promoted and encouraged by abolishment legislation, the 
only limitation will be the generation-skipping transfer tax (hereinafter sometimes 
referred to as the GSTT penalty). However, for the extremely wealthy, this may be an 
insufficient limitation in light of the overall transfer tax advantages to be gained by the 
abolishment legislation. 
The federal estate and gift tax is a transfer tax imposed on the privilege of being 
able to gratuitously transfer property during lifetime or upon death. l65 The federal 
transfer tax system taxes property passing from one generation to the next. The federal 
transfer tax is imposed to the extent the property transferred exceeds the exemption 
amounts.'66 The 1999 exemption for the federal estate and gift tax is $650,000.'67 
and that person's children be allowed to lose it, thereby helping to keep a society in which a person 
who is willing to work can get ahead whether weIl-bom or not. 
160. Bill Gates Personal Wealth Clock, (visited January 29, 1999) <hnp:/Iwww.webho.coml 
wealthclock>. 
161. This calculation is based on an annual compounding at 8% and does not take into consider-
ation the one-time federal estate and gift tax and generation-skipping transfer tax that will be imposed 
on the transfer of the Gates' wealth. See infra note 171. 
162. See supra note 159. 
163. History has demonstrated that the accumulation of wealth by individuals prohibits members 
outside that body of wealth from being represented at many levels. The poIl tax is one example of 
how the accumulation of wealth encroaches on one's constitutional rights. See Harper v. Virginia State 
Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (analogizing discrimination based on wealth to that of race 
discrimination). 
164. See supra note 159. 
165. I.R.C. § 2001. 
166. There is currently a federal estate and gift tax exemption amount of $650,000. Since 1976, 
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Mter the federal estate and gift tax exemption a transfer tax is imposed starting at 37% 
up to 55%}68 The GSTI penalty is an additional flat tax at the maximum estate tax 
rate l69 imposed on property transferred more than one generation from the settlor 
(skip transfer) to the extent said transfer exceeds the one million dollar GSTI exemp-
tion.170 
Abolishment legislation permits a trust to remain in existence in perpetuities 
without regard to the Rule. Therefore settlors can skip generations indefinitely with 
one of two options. Transfer amounts equal to the GSTI exemption and pay no GSTI 
penalty or transfer property in excess of the GSTI penalty and pay the one-time penal-
ty and avoid future transfer taxes. 171 The abolishment legislation places the federal 
government in a position in which it imposes the only limitation on dead hand control. 
The wealthy settlor can transfer one million dollars without any additional transfer tax. 
Only transfers that exceed the GSTI exemption may be discouraged from doing so in 
light of the GSTI penalty. In However, transfers in excess of the GSTI exemption 
remain advantageous for wealthy settlors. The transfers in excess of the GSTI exemp-
the exemption amount is represented in the Internal Revenue Code by way of a unified credit. I.R.C. 
§ 2010. See infra note 167. The unified credit is equivalent to the amount of tax that would be im-
posed on the federal estate and gift tax exemption. The generation transfer tax exemption amount is 
$1.000.000. I.R.C. § 2631. 
167. I.R.C. § 2010. The unified credit is a tax on the amount property is expected to increase to 
$650.000 in I 20 10 
Furthermore. year to one dollars. 
wealthy settlors will be able to transfer one million dollars into a dynasty trust without any transfer 
taxes. 
168. I.R.C. § 2001. 
169. The GSIT tax is the taxable amount multiplied by the applicable rate. I.R.C. § 2602. The 
applicable rate is the maximum federal estate and gift tax rate imposed on the transferor. currently 
55%. 
170. Every transferor is allowed a $1.000.000 exemption from the generation-skipping transfer tax 
($2.000.000 in the case of a married couple). A GSTI penalty is imposed on a skip transfer. regard-
less of how many generations are skipped. For example. if two million dollars were transferred from 
settlor to grandchild the GSIT penalty would be $550.000 (55% of the one million dollars that ex-
ceeded the GSIT exemption). If the two million dollars were placed in a dynasty trust, no additional 
GSIT penalty would be imposed even if the $1.450.000 were left in trust to benefit future genera-
tions. This example does not take into consideration the federal estate and gift tax imposed on the 
transfer. I.R.C. § 200 1. 
171. For. example. the transfer of $1.000.000 of GSIT exempt assets invested at a growth rate of 
8%. compounded annually. and assuming a federal estate tax and generation-skipping tax of 50% 
(which was the maximum transfer tax at one time). will amount to $2.036.815.978 after 100 years. On 
the other hand. the transfer of $1.000.000 of non-exempt GSIT assets invested at the same rate of re-
turn. with the same federal estate tax. will amount to only $254.601.997 after the same period of time. 
Lawrence J. Macklin. Address at NationsBank Private Client Group Presentation (June 26. 1998). This 
example suggests that the penalty for this transferor is the difference between the transfer of exempt 
GSIT assets and non-exempt GSIT assets equaling $1.782.213.981. 
172. Id. 
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tion are only subject to one federal estate tax and one GSTI penalty. Th~se transfers 
that continue to pass down to indefinite future generations are never subject to an 
additional transfer tax. Transfers may skip generations indefinitely without additional 
cost. 173 
4. The Abolishment Legislation Fails to provide beneficiaries with a means to 
terminate 
The abolishment legislation fails to mandate alternatives for termination. Trust 
law makes it difficult for a beneficiary to terminate a dynasty truSt. 174 Termination of 
irrevocable trusts requires all competent beneficiaries to consent to the termination. 175 
Termination can not be contrary to the settlor's intent and the trust purpose must be 
accomplished. 176 Several problems arise with respect to termination of the dynasty 
trust. First, it will be impossible to get all the beneficiaries in interest to consent. 177 
Even if the beneficiaries were able to get around this requirement,178 termination will 
likely be contrary to the settlor's intent. At the trust's creation, the settlor's express in-
tent was to keep the trust ongoing in perpetuity. Secondly, spendthrift provisionsl79 
will be readily included to protect the unknown beneficiaries from the unknown credi-
tors. ISO The inclusion of a spendthrift provision will further complicate the ability of 
173. [d. The present law does not place limitations on the number of generations to be skipped by 
the transferor. However, if the abolishment legislation is enacted readily throughout America by 
wealthy settlors, as a means of avoiding transfer taxes, Congress could easily impose limitations on 
dead hand control by limiting the number of generations that define a skip transfer. Furthermore, by 
the year 2006, when the unified credit is expected to reach one million dollars, wealthy settlors will 
be able to transfer one million dollars into a dynasty trust without any transfer taxes whatsoever. 
174. Hills v. Travelers Bank & Trust Co., 7 A.2d 652 (Conn. 1939). The case involved the termi-
nation of a trust by the then-living beneficiaries. The trust provisions provided that the propeny placed 
in trust by Mr. Hills would be distributed in the following manner: his wife, Mrs. Hills, would receive 
income from the trust. Upon her death and if her sons had reached the age of thiny, the principal 
would be divided equally among the sons. If either or both of the sons had predeceased the mother or 
before the sons reached the age of thirty then the trust would be distributed to the son's issue in 
equal shares and per stirpes. Twenty-three years after the husband's death, Mrs. Hills relinquished her 
"right, title and interest in the trust estate." The sons then asked the trustee to distribute the principal 
of the trust to them, and the trustee refused to do so. 
The coun sided with the trustee. The coun reasoned that it does not have the authority to re-
make trust instruments, or to reduce or increase the size of gifts to beneficiaries because the coun is 
restrained by the donor's intent and, therefore, can only provide to the beneficiary what the decedent 
wanted the beneficiary to have. In order for a trust to be terminated all interested panies must be ade-
quately represented and agree to the trust's termination. In this instance Mr. Hills' sons had a future 
interest in the trust and their interests were not adequately represented since they did not have separate 
representation from the sons. Therefore, the court would not allow beneficiaries with a vested interest 
to shut out the existing or possible future interests by procuring a court decree for termination and 
distribution among the present holders of vested interests. 
The court also viewed distribution of the trust upon the death of Mrs. Hills as a primary pur-
pose of the trust as expressed by the decedent. 
175. [d. 
176. [d. 
177. Dynasty trusts are generally created to provide for unborn beneficiaries. Despite the fact that 
some jurisdictions may permit a guardian ad litem to be appointed to represent the unborn or permit 
the living beneficiaries to consent, trust termination is a problem. See CAL PROS. CODE § 15405 
(West 1991); Hatch v. Riggs National Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
178. [d. 
179. The inclusion of a spendthrift provison is a per se material purpose. Culver v. Title Guarantee 
& Trust Co., 70 N.E.2d 163 (N.Y. \946). 
180. In the additional· incentive jurisdiction the spendthrift provision will provide added protection 
from settlor's creditors and will be most definitely employed. See Sullivan, supra note 129, at 463. 
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the parties to tenninate. IBI 
The abolishment legislation's failure to provide tennination by the living benefi-
ciaries in certain circumstances, regardless of settlor's initial intent and the existence of 
a spendthrift provision could cost the beneficiaries dearly.'B2 Beneficiaries may be 
forced to live with trust arrangements even if termination is in everyone's best interest. 
Furthermore, beneficiaries may be forced to expend unnecessarily on legal fees and 
court costs in an attempt to have a court of equity force trust termination. Moreover, 
the costs of defending trust litigation will deplete trust assets and beneficiaries end up 
paying for both sides of an up-hill battle. More often this will result in a no-win situa-
tion for the beneficiaries because the trust will not be terminated despite what is in the 
best interest of the beneficiaries. 
In addition to the relevant concerns of dead hand control previously mentioned, 
other disadvantages include that the lack of contribution to social needs, debtor-creditor 
issues, beneficiary resentment and uninformed forum shopping. 
. Dynasty trusts will prohibit beneficiaries from gifting property for social needs. 
Property tied up in a dynasty trust will not be available for charitable purposeS.IB3 It 
is unlikely that the trustee will have the ability or desire to make charitable bequests 
from trust assets.'84 Depending on the trust's dispositive provisions, the trustee may 
refuse to distribute trust assets to a beneficiary to enable that beneficiary to make the 
charitable bequest. lss This could mean that property, an ideal candidate for a school, 
university, church or some other social need, would be deprived of the much-needed 
benefits of charitable bequests. 
As previously mentioned, dynasty trusts will likely include spendthrift provisions 
either to protect settlors in additional-incentive jurisdictionsl86 or to otherwise protect 
beneficiaries. Limiting the beneficiary's ability to alienate trust assets causes harsh 
consequences for creditors. Creditors will not be able to seize trust assets. 187 Benefi-
ciaries will be equally disadvantaged and will be deprived of the ability to use property 
as collatera1. 188 
Beneficiaries of a dynasty trust may resent their inheritance being restricted in a 
dynasty trust. Family harmony could be destroyed as a result of this resentment. IB9 
181. See Culver, supra note 179. 
182. Trust assets could be spent on unnecessary trustees' commissions. 
183. Charitable trusts are exempt from the Rule. See DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 
300. Abolishment of the Rule removes one of the incentives of establishing trusts with charitable ben-
eficiaries. Thus, the wealthy settlor will be able to control property from his grave regardless of 
whether he or she selects charitable or private beneficiaries. 
184. Trustee's fees are generally calculated as a percentage of trust assets and trust net income. 
See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14-\03 (Supp. 1998). Therefore, the trustee will have no in-
centive to make needed charitable gifts, which would directly result in lower trustee commissions. 
185. Id. 
186. See supra Part V.B.2. 
187. That is for obligtions other than for necessaries, public policy concems like alimony and child 
support and intentional torts. Bacardi v. White, 463 So.2d 218 (Fl. (985); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. 
Robertson, 65 A.2d 292 (Md. 1942) (Spendthrift trust provisions should not be extended to alimony 
claims because the ex-spouse is a favored suitor and the claim is based upon strongest public policy 
grounds); Lucas v. Lucas, 365 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. 1962) (public policy will not allow a spendthrift trust 
beneficiary to be well taken care of when those who he has a legal duty to support must do without 
such support); Dillon v. Dillon, II N.W.2d 628 (Wis. (943) (public policy will not prohibit spendthrift 
trust funds from being reached by a beneficiary's wife). 
188. See DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 226. 
189. This resentment could be further complicated by a beneficiary/trustee's exercising discretionary 
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Additionally, beneficiary resenbnent may result in litigation and additional expens-
es. l90 Furthermore, beneficiaries may be without resources to litigate if inherited 
wealth is tied up in dynasty trusts. 
The decision to forum shop may be based solely on the ability to create a dynas-
ty trust without other considerations and could have detrimental affects on the benefi-
ciaries. Unlike wills, a trust can be created in any jurisdiction. '91 A settlor does not 
have to be domiciled in the jurisdiction in which he creates an inter vivos trust. l92 
Therefore settlors may attempt to minimize transfer taxes by creating an inter vivos 
trust in an abolishment legislation jurisdiction. Settlors may be quick to act with out 
weighing the disadvantages of the foreign jurisdiction. Disadvantages that may be 
overlooked include the consideration of where suit would be broUght by or against the 
trustee and whether counsel will have to be retained in the abolishment legislation 
jurisdiction. 193 
In conclusion, if the abolishment legislation is not opposed,'94 it will be enacted 
in a majority of the jurisdictions. '9S The only limitation imposed on the dead hand 
control by these wealthy settlors is the GSTI penalty. If ever the transfer taxes were 
repealed'96 the dead hand would have the ability to control property without any lim-
its whatsoever. However, the more likely consequence of the abolishment legislation 
trend will be for Congress to take action and close the loophole by limiting the number 
of generations to be skipped. '97 This potential move by Congress will limit dead hand 
control in excess of the GSTI exemption. l98 
D. Advantages of the abolishment legislation 
There is no question that the abolishment legislation offers advantages primarily 
benefiting the wealthy with a means by which transfer taxes can be minimized. The 
decisions contrary to the wishes of another beneficiary. 
190. Some examples of additional expenses included legal expenses, court costs and other costs of 
litigation such as discovery and hiring experts to testify. 
19\. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., supra note 88. 
192. Id. 
193. It is also possible that the settlor's anomey from the jurisdiction, which has not enacted the 
abolishment legislation, may draft the document for the abolishment legislation. This practice of law by 
an attorney outside the jurisdiction in which that attorney is licensed may constitute the unauthorized 
practice of law in the abolishment jurisdiction. This author will further explore the unauthorized prac-
tice of law, as it relates to estate planning documents in a future article. 
194. By the local bar association because of the estate planning opportunities it presents or by the 
academic community because of their failure to be informed of the legislation as was the case with 
the Maryland 1998 abolishment legislation. . 
195. New York, for example, depends on its trust capital, has more trust capital than any other 
state and could not afford to lose its trust business to abolishment legislation jurisdictions. Therefore, 
New York may be forced to enact such legislation to remain competitive in the trust capital business. 
See Fraser, infra note 207. 
196. Charles D. Fox, IV, Forward Into Banle: See Their Banners Go, 138 Tr. & Est. 24 (1999); 
Jeffrey N. Pennell, Repeal? The Wealth Transfer Taxes?, 138 Tr. & Est. 52 (1999); Charles D. Fox, 
To Repeal or Not To Repeal: Is It An Issue? Tr. & Est., 1998 WLII601334. 
197. Some scholars believe that curtailing dead hand control should not be Congress' responsibility 
because Congress is interested in the federal fisc, and in breaking up great fortunes and that dead 
hand control is likely to have a low priority in Congressional concerns. DUKEMINlER, PROPERTY, supra 
note 22, at 319. 
198. This potential Congressional response to abolishment legislation will be explored in a future 
article. It is this author's opinion that dead hand control will not be a low priority if dynasty trusts 
are implemented throughout the United States so that settlors and his or her families are subject to 
one federal transfer tax. 
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abolishment legislation clearly provides an estate planning alternative for lawyers and 
their wealthy clients. Additionally the abolishment legislation will provide potential 
trust business resulting in additional income for the abolishment jurisdiction. Further-
more, the abolishment legislation carries out the settlor's intent. 
1. Estate planning opportunities for wealthy clients 
The abolishment legislation clearly provides estate planning benefits for wealthy 
clients. It provides the rich with the ability to transfer wealth to future generations, 
retain control over trust assets and pay a one time transfer tax and possible GSTI 
penalty. The federal estate tax and generation skipping transfer tax advantagesl99 
have motivated lawyers that represent wealthy clients to support the abolishment legis-
lation. Other jurisdictions may be forced to enact the abolishment legislation as their 
only alternative to compete for trust business.2OO Failure to give full consideration to 
the consequences of allowing society to be controlled by the dead will result in addi-
tional abolishment legislation being enacted. Moreover, the transfer tax advantages 
offered to wealthy individuals may force other jurisdictions201 to adopt the abolish-
ment legislation. 
With a dynasty trust in an abolishment jurisdiction, wealthy settlors will transfer 
property and such transfer will be subject to a transfer tax on the initial transfer and 
never again. If the transfer exceeds the exemption amounts, a federal estate and gift 
tax and or GSTI penalty will be imposed on the settlor or his or her estate, however, 
no future generations will be subject to additional transfer taxes. Trust beneficiaries 
will receive only a life estate in the trust assets there will be no transfer tax imposed 
on the trust assets at the beneficiaries' deaths.202 
2. The abolishment legislation is expected to generate income for the 
abolishment jurisdiction 
From an economic perspective the abolishment legislation generates trust busi-
ness in the abolishment jurisdiction, thus, additional income may further generate addi-
tional taxes for the jurisdiction. This additional income is currently beneficial to the 
citizens of the abolishing state. 
It is not surprising that South Dakota has enacted the abolishment legislation not 
only to encourage the dead hand control settlors to its state, but also to encourage new 
trust business within South Dakota.203 In South Dakota wealthy families are creating 
trust companies under the South Dakota statute. Changes in the Rule are fostering their 
decisions to do SO.204 
3. Preservation of settlor's intent to exercise dead hand control 
The abolishment legislation honors the settlor's intent. Generally, rules of con-
199. For transfer tax explanation see supra Part V.C.3 of the text; see also Dukeminier, Dynasty 
Trusts, supra note 10. 
200. See supra note 195. 
201. [d. 
202. I.R.C. § 2031 (1994). With respect to the GSTI, see supra Part V.C.3, this is a 55% penalty 
imposed on transfers that skip one or more generations. It is imposed on the initial skip transfer and 
not subsequently imposed on future generations even if the transfer skips 20 generations 
203. See supra Part V.B.2.c. 
204. Brigid McMenamin, Trust Yourself, Forbes, October 12, 1998, at 62. 
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struction and policy concerns mandate that the settlor's intent be carried out.2OS Strict 
adherence to the Rule departs from those rules of construction.206 
The preservation of the settlor's intent is important to encourage settlors to make 
inter vivos gifts. If the Rule is imposed, the settlor's intent will be sacrificed and 
settlors will be less inclined to make inter vivos gifts without the ability to exercise 
dead hand control. 
VI. Conclusion 
The recent trend toward abolishment legislation ignores the policy that underlies 
the Rule's compromise that property should be controlled by the living not the dead. 
Lawmakers are willing to return to dead hand control in favor of wealthy settlors mini~ 
mizing transfer taxes. 
Despite the fact that recent abolishment legislation requires the trustee to have 
the mere ability to sell trust assets or discretionary right to terminate, there is no man-
datory requirement forcing the trustee to take such action. Absent an abuse of discre-
tion, it is unlikely that the courts will intervene to require the trustee to do otherwise, 
even if the sale may be in the best interest of the beneficiaries. 
Abolishment legislation fails to weigh the potential consequences of dead hand 
control. Legislators are eliminating the Rule without good reasons for doing so. In 
light of generous reform, abolishment is not necessary. The initial policy justifications, 
which were instrumental in implementing the Rule will eventually return. Marketability 
of trust assets will be frustrated despite the trustee's ability to sell or terminate The 
rich will get richer and the poor will get poorer as a result of the dead hand control 
perpetuating the concentration of wealth. The discouragement generated by the GSTT 
penalty will not be sufficient in light of the overall transfer tax advantages for the 
wealthy settlor. This will eventually lead to devastating results for Americans. 
Abolishment legislation is now present in seven jurisdictions. Many other juris-
dictions are considering abolishment legislation.2OO Once the abolishment legislation 
trend catches on and once jurisdictions begin to loose their trust business to neighbor-
ing jurisdictions, it will create a domino effect and additional jurisdictions will be 
forced to abolish the rule to keep trust business with its boarders. 
Before this trend progresses the legislators must recognize that the abolishment 
legislation permits property rights to be controlled by the dead not the living, the poli-
cy concerns that underlie the Rule's compromise should not be ignored. The sacrifice 
of dead hand control in exchange for another transfer tax loophole for the wealthy 
settlor is outrageous. State legislators should not pennit dead hand control to be left to 
the federal government by way of the GSTT penalty. 
The elimination of the Rule and allowing one to control his or her property from 
the grave over time will present harsh consequences. If at first glance, something 
sounds too good to be true, it probably is. Abolishment legislation needs to be stopped 
before it is too late. 
205. Those rules of construction and policy considerations justify the enforcement of the spendthrift 
trust Broadway Nat'! Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882). 
206. Some scholars believe the object of the Rule is to defeat the settlor's intent. GRAY supra note 
I; DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 303. 
207. Katharine Fraser, Trust-Friendly Legislation Urged for New York, AM. BANKER, February 9, 
1998, at 8. 
